We derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the local identi…cation of the …nite dimensional parameters in a semiparametric dynamic discrete choice model under additive separability and conditional independence assumptions (Rust (1987) ). We show that the policy value approach commonly used in the two-step estimation methodologies has convenient features so that the conditional version of Rothenberg's (1971) parametric identi…cation results can be readily applied. These conditions are easy to check under the popular extreme value distributional assumption and when the payo¤ function has a linear-in-parameter speci…cation. Our approach does not depend on the discreteness of the choice variable. Therefore it can be used to check the local identi…cation in other Markov decision models. These conditions can be useful when the researchers …nd the criterion functions appear to have ‡at regions around the extrema. Our approach can also be used when the value of the discounting factor is unknown. JEL Classification Numbers: C5, C14, C44
Introduction
A class of an in…nite horizon dynamic discrete choice models under stationary environment is a useful tool for modeling economic problems. The estimation of these models can be computational demanding due to the presence of the value functions that do not have closed forms. We consider the line of research that builds on Rust's (1987) study of dynamic discrete choice problems under additive separability and conditional independence assumptions. Hotz and Miller (1993) propose a two-step estimator that reduce the computational burden by not having to repeatedly solve the dynamic programming problem. This has led to numerous methodological papers, and more recently in the context of dynamic games of incomplete information.
The interest in the estimation problem naturally leads to the question regarding identi…cation.
Most results on identi…cation in this literature is nonparametric. A well known negative result of Rust (1994) In this paper, we derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the local identi…cation of semiparametric dynamic discrete choice models that can be checked from the data. Our model is semiparametric as we do not assume the parametric form of the transition law and observable states need not be discrete. Our approach is general and does not depend on the discreteness of the choice variable.
We provide analogous conditions that can be used to check the local identi…cation of related Markov decision models considered in Srisuma (2010b) .
The notion of local identi…cation is of fundamental importance and it is a necessary condition for global identi…cation. Locally identi…ed models also permit standard asymptotic analysis of point estimators. This has a particular empirical signi…cance in this literature since dynamic structural models can be very complicated and it is not uncommon that the researchers …nd the objective functions to have ‡at regions around the extrema. For this reason, Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) also propose a bound estimation method to estimate a set identi…ed model. However, Srisuma (2010a) shows that some point-identi…ed models may be mistaken to be set-identi…ed when the user-chosen criterion functions are poorly chosen. Since the choice of the estimation methodology (hence the criterion functions) is independent of the (local) identi…ability of the model, the conditions in this paper can help to distinguish the source of (near) non-uniqueness of the solution of the criterion function. To our knowledge, there are no general results on the local identi…cation for this class of parametric or semiparametric Markov decision models.
Our approach follows Rothenberg (1971) , who provides identi…cation results for a nonlinear parametric model. Generally, conditions for local identi…cation in nonparametric and semiparametric models can be di¢ cult to interpret and verify. For some nonparametric examples see Newey and Powell (2003), Chernozhukov, Imbens and Newey (2007) and Florens and Sbai (2010) . Chen, Chernozhukov, Lee and Newey (2011) provide a more primitive set of su¢ cient conditions for the local identi…cation of nonparametric and semiparametric conditional moment models in Hilbert spaces. In contrast, under some mild regularity conditions, the identi…ability condition in Rothenberg is equivalent to the full rank condition of an information matrix. The in…nite dimensional parameter in our problem is the value function, which is nonparametrically identi…ed and can be pro…led. In this case we can apply the parametric approach of Rothenberg. The practicality of our results depends on how easily the value function can be estimated. In-line with the growing two-step estimation literature, we focus on the identi…ability of the pseudo-model (de…ned below) that is based on the policy value. The policy value is de…ned as a solution to some linear equation that can be easily estimated.
However, the idea behind our results is general and it immediately applies to the underlying model where the value function is identi…ed by some …xed point constrain.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de…nes the policy values in a familiar dynamic discrete decision problem and discusses the identi…cation problem. Section 3 derives the conditions for the local identi…cation in the discrete choice model for single agent problems and dynamic games. Section 4 discusses how analogous conditions can be used to verify the local identi…cation for related decision models where the choice variable is not necessarily discrete. Section 5 concludes.
Discrete Decision Processes
We …rst de…ne the decision process of interest and introduce the main modeling assumptions. We introduce the policy values approach in 2.2 and de…ne identi…ability in 2.3.
Framework
We consider a decision process of a forward looking agent who solves the following in…nite horizon intertemporal problem. The random variables in the model are the control and state variables, denoted by a t and s t respectively. The control variable, a t , belongs to a …nite set of alternatives A = f1; : : : ; Kg. The state variables, s t , have support S R L+K . At each period t, the agent observes s t and chooses an action a t in order to maximize her discounted expected utility. The present period utility is time separable and is represented by u (a t ; s t ). The agent's action in period t a¤ects the uncertain future states according to the (…rst order) Markovian transition density p (ds t+1 js t ; a t ).
The next period utility is subjected to discounting at the rate 2 (0; 1). Formally, for any time t, the agent is represented by a triple of primitives (u; ; p), who is assumed to behave according to an optimal decision rule, f (s )g 1 =t , in solving the following sequential problem
Under some regularity conditions, see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) and Rust (1994) , Blackwell's Theorem and its generalization ensure the following important properties. First, there exists a stationary (time invariant) Markovian optimal policy function : S ! A so that (s t ) = (s t+ )
for any s t = s t+ and any t; , where
Secondly, the value function, de…ned in (1), is the unique solution to the Bellman's equation
Next we introduce the main modeling assumptions.
Assumption MD1: The discounting factor is known.
Assumption MD2: The state s t = (x t ; " t ) has an observable component x t and we do not observe " t . The support of x t is a compact subset of R L , denoted by X. The support of " t is R K .
Assumption MD3: The transitional density has the following factorization:
) is the conditional distribution of " t whose …rst moment exists and its conditional distribution is is known. we are interested in identifying from the disribution of (a t ; x t ). MD1 -MD4 are assumed for the remainder of Section 2.
Statistical Model
Under our modeling assumptions, the policy and value functions can be written as
We can de…ne the statistical model in terms of the conditional probabilities of a t given x t through . The model is therefore the collection of choice probabilities fP g 2 such that
where w (a; x) denotes (a;
We assume that the model is well speci…ed, so that the data is generated from (u ; ; p) for some 2 . We denote its implied policy function by 0 and the corresponding choice probabilities by P 0 . The main di¢ culty in the study of such structural models come from the recursive structure of the problem. The optimization problem involves the value function that has no closed form and is only de…ned as a …xed point to the Bellman's equation. We take the policy value approach that de…nes closely related objects to the value functions. For any , de…ne the value function corresponding to a particular stationary Markovian policy by
which is the solution to the following policy value equation
The existence and uniqueness of the policy values follow from the conditions discussed in Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) when the support of s t is bounded, and analogous arguments in Rust (1994) can be used when the support of is unbounded. We only consider the policy value functions that are generated by the policy observed from the data. For notational simplicity we suppress the explicit on 0 and focus our attention on a class of policy values fV g 2 , where for any
By de…nition of the optimal policy V = W , since 0 is equal to , but V and W are generally di¤erent for other . The practical importance of the policy value is that V is a solution to a linear equation. All the cited papers in the introduction that use a two-step approach base their estimation strategy on such policy values in some way or another. We now use fV g 2 to de…ne the pseudo-model.
Under the conditional independence assumption, the continuation value can be written as a conditional expectation w.r.t. the observed distribution,
where E [V (s t )j x t ] is the solution to
The equation above follows from taking conditional expectation of (4) w.r.t. x t , which can be represented by a matrix equation when x t has …nite support. For convenience, these conditional expectations can be written in a linear functional notations as follows:
where r is the ex-ante expected payo¤ given state
for any x 2 X; H is an integral operator that generates the choice speci…c expected next period values of its operands operator Hm (x; a) = E [m (x t+1 ) jx t = x; a t = a] for any (x; a) 2 X A. Generally m is the unique solution to a well-posed type II integral equation since the operator L is a contraction;
it is easy to see that the norm of the operator L is in a Banach space of bounded functions under
We de…ne the pseudo-model to be the collection of choice probabilities fP g 2 such that
By construction P equals P 0 .
Note that, by additivity r (x t ) = E [ ( 0 (s t ) ; x t ) jx t ] + E " 0 (st);t jx t , the …rst term of the sum only depends on the observables and the latter is identi…able from P 0 by Hotz and Miller's (1993) inversion theorem. The operators L and H also only depend on the distributions of the observables.
Srisuma and Linton (2010) show that L; H and r can be consistently estimated under mild regularity conditions for any . Therefore we proceed by taking v and P to be known upto .
Scope of Identi…cation
We shall focus our attention on the identi…cation of the pseudo-model. We de…ne the notion of identi…cation in the usual way. Let P ( jx t ) denote any conditional probability function de…ned on
A that is known upto the unknown parameter 2 .
Definition 1: Two parameter points and 0 are said to be observationally equivalent in fP g 2 if P (ajx t ) = P (ajx t ) almost surely for all a:
Definition 2: A collection of conditional probability functions fP g 2 is said to be identi…ed at 0 if there is no other in which is observationally.
We say that a collection of conditional probability functions fP g 2 is identi…ed if it is identi…ed at every point in . It is clear that, if is not identi…ed in the underlying model then it also cannot be identi…ed in the pseudo-model. In such case, there exist 0 6 = so that (u 0 ; ; p) also generates the policy 0 , then by the de…nitions of the value functions and policy value functions V 0 must equal W 0 , although V 0 and V need not be the same. Since the model implied choice probabilies, de…ned in (7), can also be written as (cf. (2))
it follows that P 0 (ajx t ) = P 0 (ajx t ) must hold almost surely for all a. This means that if is identi…ed in the pseudo-model then it is also identi…ed in the underlying model. However, the lack of identi…cation of the pseudo-model is uninformative on the identi…ability of . We next give the de…nition of local identi…cation for the pseudo-model.
Definition 3:
A collection of conditional probability functions fP g 2 is said to be locally identi…ed at 0 if there exists an open neighborhood around 0 containing no other element which is observationally equivalent.
We say that a collection of conditional probability functions fP g 2 is locally identi…ed if it is locally identi…ed at every point in . The lack of local identi…cation in the underlying model at any 0 implies the pseudo-model is also not locally identi…ed at 0 . Of course it is much more desirable to provide a global identi…cation result but this is often very di¢ cult in a general nonlinear model. However, establishing necessary and su¢ cient conditions for local identi…cation has some useful practical implications. In the next section we provide conditions for the pseudo-model to be locally identi…ed and explain that there are immediate, analogous results for the local identi…cation of the underlying model.
Local Identi…cation in Discrete Choice Processes

Local Identi…cation in Single Agent Models
Let` (a; x) denote log P (ajx). In this section it will be useful to make the following distinctions:
denote the conditional expectation operator that integrates with respect to P 0 ( jx t ) and, similarly, E [ j x t ] with respect to P ( jx t ).
Assumption A1: The parameter space is an open and bounded convex subset in R J :
Assumption A2: The payo¤ function (a; x) is uniformly bounded on A X and is continuously di¤erentiable in on A X:
The set of (a; x) such that P (ajx) > 0 is the same for all 2 . And the implied choice probabilities P (ajx) and the log choice probabilities` (a; x) are continuously di¤erentiable with respect to on A X.
Assumption A4: The elements of the conditional information matrix
exist and are continuous functions of everywhere in almost surely.
These assumptions are a version (of a conditional analog) of Assumptions I -V found in Rothenberg (1971). Clearly conditions A2 to A4 are not independent, and despite A3 and A4 appear to be high level they can be derived from a more primitive set of conditions of the data generating process, Proof. This follows from the proof of (the conditional version of) Theorem 1 in Rothenberg
Most applications of dynamic discrete choice models assume the i.i.d. extreme value assumption on the unobservable states. 1 Then the choice probabilities have a closed-form expression in terms of the objects which are estimable.
Assumption A5: The distribution of " t is known to be distributed as i.i.d. extreme value of type I across K alternatives independent of x t .
Corollary 1.
Under Assumptions A1 -A5 and MD1 -MD4: let 0 be a regular point of R almost surely then the pseudo-model is locally identi…ed at 0 if and only if
has rank J almost surely when = 0 .
Proof. The conditional log-likelihood has the following form, (e.g. see Srisuma and Linton (2010) ),`
Taking derivative of` w.r.t. to obtain the score,
and its outer product is
Taking conditional expectation of the matrix above w.r.t. P ( jx t ) gives the desired expression of
The derivative @v @ is identi…ed for the same reason as v since
where
is known for all . Since E [ j x t ] is estimable, the local identi…cation condition can be checked from the data. We note that the support of x t is very often modelled to be …nite in empirical applications by manual discretization.
A common speci…cation for is the linear-in-parameter assumption, which may signi…cantly help reduce the computational e¤ort in estimating these dynamic models; see Bajari, Benkard and Under A6 and MD4 we can write r = > r 0 + r 1 , where r 0 (
Note that r 1 and v 1 are independent of . In the special case that is linear in , the conditions for local identi…cation can be simpli…ed further.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions A1 -A6 and MD1 -MD4: let 0 be a regular point of R almost surely then the pseudo-model is locally identi…ed at 0 if and only if
Proof. The proof then follows immediately from Corollary 1 since
As an illustration, we consider a dynamic binary choice problem that shows the coe¢ cients of a common regressor for di¤erent alternatives may be (locally) identi…ed, whereas only their di¤erence may be identi…ed in the static framework.
An Example.
We assume conditions MD1 -MD4 hold. For simplicity we take the payo¤ function to be linear in the parameters with two alternatives, A = f1; 2g. Let (a;
for some known real value functions 1 and 2 , so 2 R 2 and x 2 R L . We now write out the components of e 0 for this case, for any x:
Transforming r by the operator (1 L) 1 yields
for a 0 = 1; 2, and ' denotes the kernel of the integral operator L (1 L) 1 . 2 Transforming m by H leads to, for all (a; x),
where Suppose 1 = 2 = . When = 0, i.e. there are no dynamics, it is common knowledge that we can only hope to identify the di¤erence 1 2 since the only relevant events are sets of the type f( 1 2 ) (x t ) " 2;t " 1;t g. Thus far, we have been silent about the distribution of f" a;t g, we assume further that A5 also holds. Then, by Corollary 2, it is easy to show that R (x t ) = (x t ) 2 D (x t ), where D (x t ) is a symmetric matrix such that
It follows that D (x) is singular for any and x. Therefore R (x) is singular for all and x.
Of course, we expect this since it is clear that the model is not locally identi…ed anywhere on .
However, this is not necessarily the case when 6 = 0 and it may be possible to identify the coe¢ cients of common regressors since the expected di¤erence in payo¤s across alternatives need not factor. In particular, the di¤erence in the expected values of choosing between the alternatives is
Intuitvely, the expected cumulative e¤ects between choosing di¤erent alternatives can help identify the level of the choice speci…c e¤ect in a dynamic problem. Since v 0 is estimable, conditions for the local identi…cation of the pseudo-model in Corollary 2 are testable.
It is also possible to incoperate some parametric restrictions in our local identi…cation analysis.
Assumption A7: The vector is known to satisfy a set of Q constraint equations q ( ) = 0 for q = 1; : : : ; Q where each q is a known function posessing continuous derivatives.
We de…ne to be the Jacobian matrix for the q , i.e. is a Q by J matrix such that
. And for a given x and , let M (x) denote the (J + Q) by J partitioned matrix
then we have the following theorem. Proof. This follows immediately from the proof of (the conditional version of) Theorem 2 in Rothenberg (1971) .
Note that if we also assume A5 and A6 we can be more speci…c about the form of R that enter M in Theorem 2, as seen from Corollaries 2 and 3.
We end this section by pointing out that we also can obtain analogous local identi…cation conditions for the underlying model. Recall that P is de…ned analogously to P , the di¤erence is in the representation of the future payo¤s (see equations (3) and (7)). For the former, Rust (1994) 
Local Identi…cation in Dynamic Games
The development of empirical dynamic games is of recent interest especially in the industrial or- (2010), who take the two-step approach, also discuss the estimation of the same class of games. We follow their approach that builds on the previous section.
Setup
There are N players, indexed by fig. We consider a simultaneous-move game. At time t, player i has information (state variable) s it and chooses an action (control variable) a it , from a …nite set A i = f1; : : : ; K i g, to maximize her discounted expected utility. Each player's utility is time separable and may depend on the other players' actions and states. We denoted this by u i (a t ; s t ), where
A N , and a it denotes the actions of all other players except player i; s t ; s it and s it are de…ned analogously as elements in S; S i and SnS i respectively, where S i is a subset of R L i +K i and S = S 1 S N . The actions of all players today a¤ect their uncertain future information according to the Markovian transition density p (ds t+1 js t ; a t ). The next period's utility is subjected to discounting at the rate i 2 (0; 1). The equilibrium concept can be de…ned through the notion of best response strategy (optimal policy).
Definition 5: A Markov perfect equilibrium is a strategy pro…le f i g ; such that for all i;
where i (s it ) denotes the strategy pro…le of all players apart from player i and W i satis…es
We next introduce the modeling assumptions that are natural extensions of MD1-MD4.
The discounting factors i are known for all i.
Assumption MD2
0 : The state s it = (x t ; " i t ) has an observable component x t and we do not observe "
The transitional density has the following factorization:
) is the conditional distribution of " i t whose …rst moment exists and its conditional distribution is is known.
Assumption MD4
0 : The per period payo¤ function u i is additive separable such that u i; i (a t ; x t ; " t ) = i; i (a t ; x t ) + P a2A " i a;t 1 [a t = a] and i; is known upto i 2 i R J i for all i.
In MD2 0 , we can interpret x t as the public information and " i t is the private information for player i. MD3 0 implies the conditional independence and imposes that the private values are independent across players with known distributions. MD4 0 maintains the additive separability speci…cation and restricts that the private information does not directly a¤ect the utility across players.
When X is …nite, Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008, Theorem 1) proof the existence of the Markov perfect equilibrium using Brouwer's …xed point theorem. They also characterize the equilibrium concept through the conditional choice probabilities under these conditions. Their results can be straightforwardedly extended to the case when X is compact but not necessarily …nite by appealing to …xed point theorems in in…nite dimensional spaces, e.g. Schauder or Tikhonov …xed point theorems (see Granas and Dugundji (2003) ).
In order to provide conditions for the local identi…cation in discrete action games, we proceed by de…ning the policy values and the implied choice probabilities for each player. The additional di¢ culty that arises in the study of games is that games may have multible equilibria. One way to approach this problem is to consider an incomplete model (Tamer (2003) ). However, similar to the other papers we have referenced earlier, we do not model this and assume the data is generated from a single equilibrium pro…le that we denote by f i;0 g. Then, similar to Section 2.2, we de…ne the following policy value equation that de…nes the policy value for each player:
where ( i;0 ; i;0 ) denotes the strategy pro…le that is consistent with the data generating process.
Under the conditional independence assumption, in this private value paradigm, taking conditional expectation of the equation above w.r.t. x t , under MD3 0 , yields
and we also have
Similar to (5) and (6), we can succinctly write the two equations above as follows:
Note that the existence and uniqueness of the solution to these N integral equations follow for the same reason as in the single agent problem. Let
, then we can de…ne the implied choice probability, denoted by P i; i , as follows
Compared to the single agent problem, we have a system of N decision problems. Since r i; i ; v i; i ; L i and H i are functionals of the distributions of the observed data, they are nonparametrically identi…ed under MD1 0 -MD4 0 and some mild regularity conditions for all i and i.
Results
In this independent value paradigm we can simply de…ne the statistical model through as the collection of product of choice probabilities N i=1 P i; i 2 . We assume that the model is well speci…ed, i.e. the data is generated from u i; i ; f i g ; p for some 2 and we denote the implied distribution by
For a given P 0 we de…ne the pseudo-model through the model implied choice probabilities N i=1 P i; i 2 . We de…ne the identi…cation and local identi…cation concepts for the model and the pseudo-model using De…nitions 1-3 in Section 2.3.
Let`i ; i (a; x) denote log P i; i (ajx)
The parameter space i is an open and bounded convex subset in R J i for all i.
Assumption A2 0 : The payo¤ function i; i (a i ; x) is uniformly bounded on i A i X and is continuously di¤erentiable in i on A i X for all i.
Assumption A3
0 : The set of (a i ; x) such that P i; i (a i jx) > 0 is the same for all i 2 i , and the implied choice probabilities P i; i (ajx) and the log choice probabilities`i ; i (a; x) are continuously di¤erentiable with respect to i on A i X for all i.
Assumption A4
0 : The elements of the conditional information matrix
exist and are continuous functions of i everywhere in i almost surely for all i.
These are natural analogs of A1 -A4. Proof. It is intuitive that we can simply check the local identi…cation of the pseudo-model of each player separately since " i t is conditionally independent across all players. To show this formally, we see that the joint conditional log-likelihood, denote this by` (a t ; x t ), can be written as a sum of the marginals P N i=1`i ; i (a it ; x t ). The score is a vector of the marginal scores
whose outer product is a J by J matrix that can be partitioned into N squared matrices of the
, which occupy the blocks along the diagonal, and all other elements of the matrix are products of the scores of between di¤erent pairs of players. Taking conditional expection with respect to the model implied choice probabilities we have
This follows by de…nition of R i; i when i = j, otherwise, since " It is clear from the proof of Theorem 3 that we can locally identify some parameters of certain players even if we cannot do so for all players. This may be used to help identify the parameters of other players, we show below an analogous local identi…cation result that accommodates some parametric restrictions. Notice also that v i; i is estimable independently from the parameters of the other players. Next we consider the popular conditional logit as a special case.
Assumption A5
0 : The distribution of " i t is known to be distributed as i.i.d. extreme value of type I across K alternatives independent of x t for all i.
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions A1
0 -A5 0 and MD1 0 -MD4 0 : let i0 be a regular point of R i; i almost surely for all i then the pseudo-model is locally identi…ed at 0 if and only if
has rank J i almost surely for all i when = 0 .
Proof. From comparing (7) with (9), as seen from Corollary 2, it follows that the conditional likelihood can be written as
In particular P i; i (a i jx) = exp (v i; i (a i ; x)) = P a2A i exp (v i; i (a; x)) for any (a; x). The proof then follows immediately from Corollary 2 and Theorem 3.
We can simplify the Corollary further when i; i has the linear-in-parameter speci…cation. 
Assumption A6
Proof. Immediate from Corollaries 3 (cf. Corollary 2).
It is also possible to incoperate some parametric restrictions in our local identi…cation analysis as we have shown in Theorem 2. Let be the Q by J Jacobian matrix as de…ned in Section 3. We de…ne V (x) to denote the (J + Q) by J partitioned matrix Proof. This follows immediately from the proof of (the conditional version of) Theorem 2 in Rothenberg (1971) .
As mentioned at the end of Section 2, if we also assume A5 0 and A6 0 then we can be more speci…c about the forms of W that enter V in Theorem 3. We can also write down analogous identi…cation results for the underlying model since relevant expected values are identi…ed through the …xed point of contraction maps, for more details, see Rust's (1994) discussion of nested …xed point algorithm for games.
Other Markov Decision Models
The focus on Markov decision problems in this literature has been on those models with discrete choice, as evident from the recent survey by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2008) . However, there has also been an increasing interest in closely related decision models, under the conditional independence assumption analogous to MD3 (and MD3 0 ), where the control variable is not discrete; see Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and the references in Srisuma (2010b) for some examples. To avoid repetition, we only provide the conditions for the local identi…cation in the decision model with purely continuous choice (analogous to Theorem 1); we brie ‡y discuss how to obtain analogous conditions for the location identi…cation of other Markov decision models.
We note that the notations used to de…ne the sequential problem (1) in Section 2, along with the parameterized value functions (W ) and policy value functions (V ) do not depend on the discreteness of a t . So we begin with the modeling assumptions.
Assumption MC1: The discounting factor is known.
Assumption MC2: The state s t = (x t ; " t ) has an observable component x t and we do not observe " t . The support of x t is a compact subset of R L , denoted by X. The support of " t is some convex subset of R.
Assumption MC3: The transitional density has the following factorization: p (dx t+1 ; d" t+1 jx t ; " t ; a t ) =
) is the conditional distribution of " t whose …rst moment exists and its conditional distribution is is known.
Assumption MC4: The per period payo¤ function u is known upto 2 R J and has increasing di¤erences in (a; ") for all x; . Since a t is now continuous, it will be convenient to de…ne the model and pseudo-model in terms of the conditional distribution functions. Let fF g 2 denote the model, where F is the implied conditional distribution functions (cf. P in (3)), namely
Blevins (2010) and Schrimpf (2011) show that E [W (s t+1 ) jx t ; a t ] is identi…ed as the …xed point of a contraction map when a t is a mixed-continuous and continuous random variable respectively.
Analogously, let fF g 2 denote the pseudo-model through the policy value so that F denotes the pseudo-model implied conditional distribution functions (cf. (8))
We brie ‡y discuss how the identi…cation argument for E [V (s t+1 ) jx t ; a t ] di¤ers from the discrete choice problem. We …rst note that this expected value function satis…es the same linear equations in (5) and (6), and the operators L and H are de…ned as the conditional expectation operators of the observables as in Section 2. The only di¤erence is how the unobserved state variable enters the intercept term, r , in the in the integral equation (5) . Recall that r (
In the discrete choice framework, with the additive separability assumption in MD4, we use Hotz and
Miller's inversion theorem to identify r . In this framework, the increasing di¤erence assumption in MC4 (together with conditional independence), it can be shown that the policy function 0 (x; ") is increasing in " for all x by Topkis' Theorem. Therefore " t is identi…ed from the quantile of a t , since we observe the (conditional) distribution of a t and we assume the distribution of " t ; see Bajari, Then we can immediately de…ne observationally equivalence, identi…ablity and local identi…ability of any model fF g 2 through the conditional distribution functions instead of the probability functions (see . Let E [ j x t ] denote the conditional expectation operator that integrates with respect to F ( jx t ).
Assumption B1: The set of (a; x) such that F (ajx) > 0 is the same for all 2 . And the implied choice probabilities F (ajx) is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to on A X.
Assumption B2: The elements of the matrix
exist and are continuous functions of everywhere in almost surely. 
Conclusions
There are several formal results on the nonparametric identi…cation of a popular class of Markov decision models. However, most estimation methodologies in the literature are parametric or semiparametric, which often have little connection with the existing identi…cation results. We provide testable identi…cation conditions for the semiparametric pseudo-model that do not involve solving any dynamic optimization problems; following Hotz and Miller (1993) . The necessary condition for these estimators to be consistent for the structural parameters of interest relies on the local identi…-cation of the pseudo-model. We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the local identi…cation of the pseudo-model in both the single agent and dynamic game frameworks with discrete action.
These conditions are particularly easy to verify under the popular assumptions that the unobserved state variables follow i.i.d. extreme value distribution and the payo¤ has a linear-in-parameter speci…cation. We also provide analogous conditions for the decision problems in which the choice variable is not discrete. Establishing local identi…cation is useful since it is a necessary condition for the model to be identi…ed, and locally identi…ed models permit applications of the usual asymptotic theory for point estimators. These local identi…cation conditions can also be helpful in practice if an estimate appears to be in a ‡at region of the objective function. When local identi…cation fails then set inference should be considered, e.g. see Manski (2003) and Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007) . Our approach is not restricted to analyzing pseudo-models. But for the same reason that there is a large and growing literature for the two-step methods, it may be computationally infeasible to consider the identi…cation of the underlying model.
In this paper we use the local identi…cation arguments for a parametric model in Rothenberg (1971) to derive the local identi…cation conditions for semiparametric Markov decision problems. Our approach also illustrates a general point that the local (and global) analysis in parametric models can be applied to some general semiparametric problems. In particular, a su¢ cient condition for this is when the in…nite dimensional parameter can be (smoothly) pro…led and is nonparametrically identi…ed on the parameter space. For examples, if the in…nite dimensional parameter is known a priori to be nonparametrically identi…ed, then: (i) the results in Rothenberg (1971) are immediately applicable to the class of semiparametric models that Severini and Wong (1992) terms conditionally parametric models; (ii) a su¢ cient condition for the local identi…cation of the …nite dimensional parameter can be obtained based on a simple rank condition of the Jacobian matrix in a class of pro…led semiparametric moment models in Pakes and Olley (1995) . 3 The advantage of the analysis based on a parametric approach is that the analogous results in a general nonlinear semiparametric model often rely on conditions that are more di¢ cult to interpret and verify, e.g. see Chen et al.
(2011).
Finally, our local identi…cation conditions also accommodate the case when we relax the knowledge of the discounting factor. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show that the discounting factor may be identi…ed under certain exclusion or parametric restrictions. The implications of our theorems still hold by including in the vector of parameters .
